Heads of great powers, Arab states, and their foreign ministers, are talking a lot about their fear of seeing the Syrian crisis move to Lebanon. Western states reiterate their anxiety that the Syrian regime will itself move this crisis in this direction, and that its allies – meaning Iran and Hezbollah – will handle this, as President Francois Hollande said two days ago. Likewise, Russia and China are content with giving advice and pressuring their ally, the Syrian regime, to prevent this.

Diplomats from these countries in Beirut do not cease to raise this fear; the representatives of these states do not waver from going so far as to encourage Lebanese groups to continue their efforts to cement stability and avoid seeing the Syrian crisis move to Lebanon. They are fully aware that both Lebanese camps are up to their ears in the crisis, in their calculations of what might develop in Syria, and in their estimation of what this might produce in Lebanon. Each is partisan, toward the regime or the opposition.

If the division among the Lebanese over Syria justifies the fears of seeing the crisis move to their country, the Lebanese have so far succeeded in managing this division, with the least possible damage in security terms. The president, Michel Suleiman, has played a key role in this up to now. He has benefited from the fact that both large camps see their interest in not moving the violence inside Syria to the Lebanese arena, each for its own reason. The March 8 group is wagering on the regime holding out, and on the weakness it has suffered, which do not mean that the "resistance axis," of which this group constitutes an extension in Lebanon, will be weakened in the country's political formula. The March 14 camp, which has no security or military capability to destabilize things in the first place, is reassured that events will play out in such a way that Damascus will lift its grip on its neighbor, and allow it to move freely.

Despite the arrogance and denials by the March 8 group, when it comes to the inevitability of change in Damascus, its leaders are aware, like their rivals, that this change is coming, and that the problem will be not in moving the crisis to Lebanon, but the transition to change in the country, and how to manage this change domestically.

The dynamics of this change in Syria have yet to become clear in terms of the political authority, as we await the ideas that will be put forward by the UN-Arab League envoy Lakhdar Brahimi, and there have been many discussions between the concerned countries, including the Middle East quartet sponsored by Egypt. Meanwhile, the Lebanese are facing significant events, most prominently the parliamentary election round in the spring, which will test the degree to which they are adapting to the coming change.

It is silly to think that there will be no change in Lebanon, following the change in Damascus. Failing to notice that the political formulas in Lebanon, created by the Syrian management of the Baath regime and the Presidents Hafez and Bashar, will eventually change, is a case of burying one's head in the sand. This system has been up to its ears in drawing Lebanon's political map in a way that serves its private interests and regional policies, in terms of politics and finance. The map was drawn by intelligence agencies and by using force, murder, intimidation, enticement and setting off the country's internal contradictions.

This management of Lebanon with Iran helped build an arsenal of weapons and rockets and an army of fighters, with a sectarian basis as they carry out their regional functions. This exceeds Lebanon's tolerance and goes beyond the bargains that are allowed by the domestic mosaic, and the already-fragile Lebanese state institutions. In the last few months, the president has reiterated several times the saying that Arab countries moving toward democracy should lead to the Lebanese improving the practice of their democratic system. Isn't this a call to both sides to sense the coming danger and prepare for it domestically? What does he mean when he says Lebanon "has suffered for more than six decades from the blessing of democracy in this East, and this blessing has subjected us to aspirations of defeating it, and besetting it with crises that threaten its very existence"? It can only be that Syria's management of Lebanon for the sake of subjecting it to regional plans should be reconsidered, in view of the change that is coming.

The problem lies in the resistance by the part of the political class that was built by the Syrian management of Lebanon, to the change coming to Lebanon. This is necessitated by the change coming to Syria, more than moving the Syrian crisis to Lebanon. This is the reason behind all of the disputes and uproar over the parliamentary election law for next year, which will produce a new political authority and elect a new president for the republic.

If Syria is one of the Arab spring countries that are moving in the direction of rotation of power, it is most important for Lebanon to return to doing what its regime used to be distinguished for, before the decades-long Syrian grip on the country.